Unconventional Monetary Policy in a Modern Paradigm of Money and Two Other Essays by Wessel, Ryan J (Author) et al.
Unconventional Monetary Policy in a Modern Paradigm of Money
and Two Other Essays
by
Ryan J Wessel
A Dissertation Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy
Approved March 2017 by the
Graduate Supervisory Committee:
Edward C. Prescott, Chair
Todd Schoellman
Bart Hobijn
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY
May 2017
ABSTRACT
This dissertation contains a portfolio of papers in economics. The first paper, “Vehicle
Emissions Inspection Programs: Equality and Impact,” presents the results of a study
of the Arizona Vehicle Emissions Inspection Program. Using a unique data set, I
find that the Arizona Vehicle Emissions Inspection Program is regressive in that
it constrains the vehicle repair decisions of people on the low end of the income
distribution more than those on the high end. I also find that the social cost of the
program in Arizona is more than twice the social benefit, assuming a $7 million value
of statistical life. The second paper is “Fiat Value in the Theory of Value.” Because of
advances in information processing technology, it is now technically feasible to have a
currency-less monetary system. This paper explores one such system. In the model,
prices are in units currency-less fiat money called fiat value, fiat value is a form of
government debt, and the services of the stock of fiat value are a factor of production.
In this system, the National accounts must be revised to account for money as a
production factor, Friedman satiation is possible even with positive inflation, and
various monetary policy regimes are explored. The third paper, “Unconventional
Monetary Policy in a Modern Paradigm of Money,” uses the model developed in
“Fiat Value in the Theory of Value” to evaluate quantitative easing and interest on
reserves policies as a response to liquidity shocks. I find that quantitative easing
is an effective response to liquidity crises because it drives the marginal product of
money to zero. When the marginal product of money is zero, the business sector
does not have to pay to rent the services of money, a production factor that is free to
create. I also show that a positive interest on reserve policy hampers the effectiveness
of quantitative easing, and that quantitative easing does not cause a high inflation
rate.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation contains a porfolio of three papers. The first is “Vehicle Emis-
sions Inspection Programs: Equality and Impact.” In this paper, I evaluate the pro-
gressivity, environmental impact, and cost efficiency of Vehicle Emissions Inspection
Programs. Using a unique dataset that combines vehicle emissions inspection results
with owner address data, I find that the Arizona Vehicle Emissions Inspection Pro-
gram is regressive in that it constrains the vehicle repair decisions of people in the low
end of the income distribution more than people in the high end. Individuals with
a lower annual income are both (i) more likely to drive vehicles that fail inspection
at a higher average rate, and (ii) more likely to fail inspection conditional on vehicle
characteristics. I also find that the social cost of administering the Vehicle Emissions
Inspection Program in Arizona is more than twice the social benefit using a $7 mil-
lion value of statistical life. Finally, I propose and test two counter-factual policies
designed to increase the benefit/cost ratio and mute regressivity of Vehicle Emissions
Inspection Programs.
The second paper is “Fiat Value in the Theory of Value,” and is joint work with
Edward C. Prescott. Because of advances in information processing technology, it
is now technically feasible to have a currency-less monetary system. We explore one
such system. We develop a model where the services of currency-less fiat money, called
fiat value, are a form of interest bearing government debt, the services of which are a
factor of production. Our main contributions include developing a general equilibrium
theory-of-value model with currency-less fiat money, establishing a clear definition of
government policy, showing how the national accounts must be revised to reflect a fiat
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value payment system, and exploring how various money interest rate target regimes
and various inflation rate target regimes impact our measure of welfare. We also show
that Friedman monetary satiation is possible without deflation.
The third paper is “Unconventional Monetary Policy in a Modern Paradigm of
Money.” In this paper, I explore quantitative easing and interest on reserves policies in
a currency-less fiat monetary system. Following the 2008 financial crisis, the Federal
Reserve purchased government debt and real assets with central bank notes, swelling
the size of the central banks assets to the unprecedented size of 25% of GDP. Also
that year, Congress authorized the Federal Reserve to pay interest on excess reserves
held by depository institutions at reserve banks. When evaluated in a fiat value
general equilibrium framework, I find that quantitative easing is an effective response
to liquidity crises because it drives the marginal product of money to zero. When
the marginal product of money is zero, the business sector does not have to pay to
rent the services of money, a production factor that is free to create. I also find that
positive interest on reserves policies exacerbate a liquidity crisis by hampering the
effects of quantitative easing. The interest on reserves rate is a lower bound on the
marginal product of money. This study suggests that a central banking authority
operating in this model world would insulate against liquidity crises by maintaining a
permanently large balance sheet and setting the rate for interest on reserves to zero.
2
Chapter 2
VEHICLE EMISSIONS INSPECTION PROGRAMS: EQUALITY AND IMPACT
2.1 Introduction
The 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act mandated Vehicle Emissions Inspection
Programs (VEIP) in large, metropolitan areas which do not meet certain federal air
quality standards. The ostensible purpose of the program is to reduce pollution by
identifying high polluting vehicles and requiring that owners have them repaired.
Currently, 32 states, plus Washington DC, require some level of vehicle emissions
testing in some areas. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the progressivity,
environmental impact, and cost efficiency of vehicle emissions inspection programs.
Data for this study comes from the Arizona Vehicle Emissions Inspection Program.
Arizona is required by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to run a VEIP
in two cities (Phoenix and Tucson) that do not meet minimum air quality standards.
The Arizona Department of Environmental Quality (ADEQ) administers the program
and the program is implemented by a private contractor. The Arizona data is detailed,
contains many data points, and contains information on many inspection methods.
This makes it a good starting point. Future work to test the external validity of the
Arizona results is needed.
One open question in the environmental economics literature is whether environ-
mental policies are regressive, meaning do they impact the poor more than the rich.
To address this question in the context of vehicle emissions inspection programs, I cre-
ate a novel data set that combines emissions inspection data with confidential vehicle
owner address data provided by the Arizona Motor Vehicle Division (MVD). Know-
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ing owner address gives a measure of the vehicle owner’s characteristics, including
income, through the American Community Survey.
Using this combined dataset, I find that the Arizona VEIP is regressive in that
it constrains the vehicle repair decisions of people in the low end of the income
distribution more than people in the high end. Low income vehicle owners are both (i)
more likely to drive vehicles that fail inspection at higher average rates, and (ii) more
likely to fail an inspection conditional on vehicle characteristics. This implies that
vehicle emissions abatement policies that subsidize vehicle repair or new car purchase
will have a greater impact on pollution if participation in the program is subject to
means testing. It also implies that programs designed to induce repair or update the
fleet will have a different impact on pollution depending on the characteristics of the
owners of the vehicles targeted.
Next, I ask whether vehicle emissions inspection programs reduce pollution, and
whether they are cost effective. Using the universe of emissions inspection results
from the 2013-2014 inspection cycle, I find that the Arizona VEIP does reduce pol-
lution by identifying high polluting vehicles and mandating that they be repaired.
However, the social cost of this program, paid in testing fees and vehicle repair costs,
is approximately twice the social benefit using a $7M value of statistical life. The
high social cost is primarily driven by testing fees as many vehicles must be inspected
to identify only few violators.
In the final section of this paper, I propose and test two alternative policy imple-
mentation methods. In the first, I stratify vehicles based on observable characteristics,
such as vehicle model year, and test the benefit/cost ratio of each stratum. I find
that for vehicles registered in Tucson, in no stratum is the benefit of the inspection
program higher than the cost. For vehicles registered in Phoenix, I find that the so-
cial benefit of the program exceeds social cost only for vehicles older than 2003 model
4
year. Based on this finding, I suggest exempting from inspection the ten newest
model years on a rolling basis. This will increase the overall benefit/cost ratio of the
program and reduce the number of vehicles tested annually by half.
In the second alternative policy proposal, I explore ways to mute the regressivity
of the program. Since owners with a higher annual income own a higher percentage of
newer cars on average, a tax-and-transfer system that discriminates based on vehicle
model year would disproportionately benefit lower income individuals, muting regres-
sivity. I explain how such a system could be implemented in a politically feasible
way.
The paper is organized as follows. Section two introduces the dataset created for
this study. Section three evaluates the distributional impact of the program. Section
four shows how the benefit/cost analysis was done. Section five discusses alternative
policy schemes that would increase the benefit/cost ratio and mute the regressivity
of the program. Section six concludes.
2.2 Data
The data used for this study was created by combining information from three
government agencies:
1. Arizona Department of Environmental Quality. The ADEQ data contains the
universe of emissions inspection results for the 2013-2014 emissions inspection
cycle. It includes basic vehicle characteristics (including Vehicle Identification
Number), whether the vehicle passed inspection, the level of pollutants emitted
during each test (where available), and the price of repairs made between a
failing test and a retest.
2. Arizona Motor Vehicle Division. The MVD data contains owner home address
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data by VIN for every vehicle registered in Arizona during 2013-2014. Because
of confidentiality concerns, zip code is the smallest statistical division allowed
by the MVD.
3. American Community Survey. The ACS 2014 5-year estimates give average
resident characteristics by home location, including annual income of households
by zip code.
This study focuses on data from the 2013-2014 emissions inspection cycle. Using
two years of data is appropriate for a number of reasons. First, most vehicles in the
data set were inspected every other year, so the natural cycle of testing is two years.
Second, there are systematic differences between vehicles tested during odd years and
those tested during even years because the testing program was not implemented
gradually. Averaging over two consecutive years alleviates these differences. Finally,
there was concern that a longer study period would conflate cross-vehicle variation
with long run advances in emission reduction technology.
There are four broad types of vehicle emissions tests used in Arizona. They are:
1. On-Board Diagnostic (OBD). Vehicles newer than 1995 model year are inspected
using this test. Data that has been continually recorded by the vehicle’s on-
board sensors is used to evaluate whether the vehicles passes inspection. As long
as certain on-board monitoring systems are working and monitored data did not
exceed 2.5 times a federally mandated level, the vehicle passes inspection. In
the 2013-2014 testing cycle, 66% of vehicles were tested with the OBD test.
2. Inspection/Maintenance 147 (IM147). Most 1981-1995 model year light duty
gasoline-powered vehicles in Phoenix are inspected using the IM147 test. In this
test, the vehicle is driven on rollers (called a dynamometer) at varying speeds to
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simulate urban driving. The exhaust of three pollutants (hydrocarbons, carbon
monoxide, and oxides of nitrogen) is measured. Levels of all three pollutants,
measured in grams per vehicle mile, must be below a certain threshold to pass.
In the 2013-2014 testing cycle, 7% of vehicles were tested with the IM147 test.
3. Loaded/Idle. Model year 1967-1980 vehicles (and some newer vehicles registered
in Tucson), are inspected with the Loaded/Idle test. Exhaust is tested while
the vehicle idles and again at approximately 25 miles-per-hour. Exhaust of
hydrocarbons and carbon monoxide must be below a certain threshold to pass.
About 9% of vehicles were tested with the Loaded/Idle test.
4. Opacity Test. Diesel vehicles are tested by measuring the opacity of the exhaust.
Less than 5% of vehicles were inspected with this test.
Approximately two million vehicles are inspected annually in Arizona at an annual
inspection cost of $36 million paid by vehicle owners. Table 2.1 reports summary
statistics for emissions inspections in the 2013-2014 testing cycle. The majority of
inspections were done in Phoenix. More than nine in 10 vehicles pass the inspection
on the first try. Table 2.2 reports summary statistics for the vehicles tested during
the 2013-2014 testing cycle. Vehicle characteristics are make, model, model year,
and odometer reading. Makes are divided into the six most common manufacturers,
plus a category for other vehicles. Vehicle models are grouped into one of four model
categories by size. Examples of those categories are given in Table 2.2.
This study will focus on model year 1981-2008 non-diesel vehicles. Current policy
exempts the five newest model years from inspection, so vehicles manufactured after
2008 are not fully represented in the 2013-2014 data. Figure 2.1 shows the number
of vehicles by model year, divided among test type. Since the number of very old
vehicles is low and since a new test type was introduced for model year 1981 vehicles,
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Table 2.1: Emissions test summary statistics (annual average)
Number of Tests 1,905,159
Location
Phoenix 78.6%
Tucson 20.1%
Other 1.3%
Pass on
First test 91.7%
Retest 5.9%
Never 2.4%
Test Type
OBD 65.6%
IM147 7.1%
Loaded/Idle 9.4%
Opacity 4.6%
Other/Missing 13.3%
all vehicles manufactured before this year were excluded.
Figure 2.2 shows the vehicle inspection pass rate for model years 1981-2008. Newer
vehicles pass emissions inspections at a higher rate. Honda brand vehicles pass inspec-
tion more than average, and this is especially pronounced for newer model Hondas
and for Hondas made during the 1980s. Ford vehicles made during the early 1990s
pass inspection at a rate higher than trend. Across all vehicles and all model years
in the study data set, 92% of vehicles pass the emissions inspection on the first try.
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Table 2.2: Vehicle summary statistics
Vehicle Type (example)
Cars (Fusion) 45.0%
Light Trucks (Ranger) 26.6%
Medium Trucks (F150) 16.9%
Heavy Trucks (F350) 11.5%
Vehicle Make
Chevrolet 15.8%
Ford 15.3%
Toyota 11.1%
Honda 7.5%
Dodge 6.8%
Nissan 6.3%
Other 37.3%
Model Year
Less than 1990 4.1%
1990-1995 8.2%
1996-2000 19.4%
2001-2005 37.6%
2006-2008 26.7%
2009+ 4.4%
Ave. Odometer 116,340 miles
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Figure 2.1: Number of vehicles inspected by model year
Figure 2.2: Percent of cars that pass on the first try by model year. Cars older than
1996 model year are tested with the IM147 test. Cars 1996 model year and newer are
testing using On-Board Diagnostics (OBD).
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2.3 Distributional Impact
One open question in environmental economics is whether environmental policies
are regressive in impact on people in the wealth distribution. Jacobsen 2013, Benzhaf
2011, Fullerton 2011, and Bento 2013 each show that various environmental policies
are regressive, costing the poor more than the rich. However, Bento and Freedman
2014 find that air pollution mitigation programs increase home prices in poor ar-
eas more than in rich areas. They conclude that this one example of a progressive
environmental policy.
In this section, I ask, ”Are vehicle emissions inspection programs regressive?” I
find that the Arizona VEIP is regressive in that it constrains the vehicle repair de-
cisions of the poor more than the rich. Lower income owners fail initial emissions
inspections more often than high income owners. Owners of vehicles that fail inspec-
tion are required to make vehicle repairs that they did not choose to make without the
program. The regressivity works through two channels. Owners with lower average
annual income are both (i) more likely to drive vehicles that fail the inspection at
higher average rates, and (ii) more likely to fail an inspection, conditional on vehicle
characteristics.
To assign ACS income data to specific vehicles, I define a household as one vehicle.
About 61% of addresses in the study data have only one vehicle registered at that
address. For the 24% of addresses with two vehicles and 15% of address with three
or more vehicles, I assume that multiple households are residing at the same address.
Eliminating addresses with multiple vehicles from the data set does not qualitatively
change the results. Further research on multiple-vehicle households could yield fruitful
results.
Figure 2.3 shows the percent of vehicles at each income level that passed the
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Figure 2.3: Percent of vehicles that passed emissions testing on the first try, by
annual income in each zip code in which the vehicle was registered.
vehicle emissions inspection on the first try. Vehicles associated with post office
boxes, vehicles regiestered out of state, and zip codes with fewer than 50 observations
were dropped. There is an upward trend, meaning that owners who live in areas with
a higher average annual income are more likely to pass the emissions inspection on
the first try.
A number of factors could contribute to a passing an emissions inspection, in-
cluding both owner characteristics and vehicle characteristics. To understand what
vehicles characteristics and owner characteristics contribute to passing the inspec-
tion, I use a linear probability model to regress owner and vehicle characteristics on
inspection passage rate. The assumed data generating process is
E = β0 + β1w + β2V + β3X +  (2.1)
where
E=probability of passing the emissions test
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w = annual income of owner
V = vehicle characteristics (odometer, make, model, model year)
X = controls (test type, county, test station, observation year)
 = error
Table 2.3 summarizes the results. Column (1) displays the results of a linear
probability model. Because probability of passing is always close to 1, in Column (2)
I repeat the regression with a logit model. Standard errors are clustered by zip code.
In both specifications, the coefficient on odometer is negative and the coefficient
on model year is positive. This is expected. Newer vehicles pass more often. Vehicles
with higher miles pass less often. The coefficients on vehicle make show that Hondas
are more likely to pass an emissions inspection than any other model in the study. The
reference vehicle make is Chevrolet. Since all the coefficients under vehicle make are
positive, this means that Chevrolets are least likely to pass the emissions inspection
on average.
The coefficient on income is significant and positive, even when controlling for
vehicle characteristics and location fixed effects. This implies that a person with
lower annual income is less likely to pass the emissions inspection, even if he drove
the same make, size, and mileage of vehicle as a person with higher annual income.
The magnitude of the effect is approximately the same as that of odometer reading:
a $10k increase in the income of the owner has approximately the same effect on the
probability of passing the emissions inspection as a reduction of 10,000 miles on the
odometer.
The effect of income, even when controlling for vehicle characteristics, could be
an indicator of how well different income groups service their vehicles. Perhaps in-
dividuals with a higher annual income change the oil more often, replace the tires
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Table 2.3: Dependent variable is probability of passing emissions test. Linear model
standard errors clustered by zip code. Logit coefficients converted to at-mean margins.
Logit model standard errors calculated using delta method.
(1) (2)
Linear Logit
Income ($10k) 0.003** 0.003**
(0.000) (0.000)
Odometer (10k miles) -0.003** -0.002**
(0.000) (0.000)
Model Year 0.005** 0.004**
(0.000) (0.000)
Make
Honda 0.045** 0.031**
(0.001) (.000)
Toyota 0.044** 0.030**
(0.001) (.000)
Nissan 0.021** 0.013**
(0.001) (.001)
Ford 0.019** 0.012**
(0.001) (.000)
Dodge 0.018** 0.011**
(0.001) (.001)
Other 0.018** 0.009**
(0.001) (.000)
N 2,243,195 2,243,195
(pseudo) R2 .06 0.11
Clusters 358
* 5%, **1%
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more often, or get the vehicle aligned more often. These maintenance activities could
contribute to the likelihood a vehicle will pass the emissions inspection.
There is a statistically significant income coefficient if I run the same long regres-
sion on the levels of each of the three measured pollutants (HC, CO, NOx) instead of
on the probability of passing the emissions inspection. Even when controlling for ve-
hicle characteristics and location fixed effects, higher income is associated with lower
levels of HC, CO, and NOx. Results of these regressions are presented in Table 2.4.
The income effect is seen in other aspects of the data. In Table 2.5, I show the
average number of tests before the vehicle passes, broken up by quintile of the income
distribution. People with lower annual income retest more often before passing. In
Table 2.6, I show the percent of vehicles tested that never pass the emissions inspection
despite multiple tries, by quintile of the income distribution. People with lower annual
income are more likely to never pass the emissions inspection.
These results suggest that the Arizona VEIP is regressive in the way it constrains
the vehicle repair decisions of owners. Owners with lower annual income are more
likely to be required to make vehicle repairs they did not choose to make prior to
the inspection. Comparing an average lowest income quintile owner to an average
highest income quintile owner, about half of the difference in inspection pass rate is
attributable to vehicle choice and about half attributable to owner income.
This result is significant because it informs policy. A vehicle emissions abatement
policy based on emissions monitoring will disproportionately constrain the vehicle
repair choices of the poor. Further, a program designed to update or repair the fleet
of vehicles will have a different impact on pollution depending on the characteristics
of the owners of the vehicles targeted.
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Table 2.4: Results of linear probability regression. Dependent variable is level of
pollutant specified, measured in grams emitted during first failing test. Standard
errors clustered by zip code.
CO HC NOx
Income ($10k) -0.301** -0.019** -0.035**
(.046) (0.003) (0.005)
Odometer (10k miles) 0.015** 0.002** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Model Year -0.716** -0.052** 0.031**
(0.053) (0.004) (0.005)
Make
Dodge -0.535 -0.074 0.493**
(0.377) (0.025) (0.047)
Ford -2.638** -0.364** -0.494**
(0.297) (0.022) (0.026)
Honda -1.753** -0.371** -0.447**
(0.333) (0.019) (0.026)
Nissan -1.742** -0.337** -0.203**
(0.342) (0.020) (0.033)
Toyota -4.637** -0.472** -0.539**
(0.323) (0.021) (0.025)
Other -1.234** -0.201** -0.059**
(0.269) (0.018) (0.021)
N 109,172 109,172 109,172
R2 0.07 0.374 0.448
Clusters 275 275 275
* 5%, **1%
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Table 2.5: Average number of tests before the vehicle passes, by quintile of the
income distribution.
Income Quintile Number of Tests Before Pass
First ($13K - $49k) 1.31
Second ($49K - $59k) 1.25
Third ($59K - $71k) 1.22
Fourth ($71K - $91k) 1.18
Fifth ($91K + ) 1.15
Table 2.6: Percent of vehicles that never pass emissions, by quintile of the income
distribution.
Income Quintile Percent Never Pass
First ($13K - $49k) 3.6%
Second ($49K - $59k) 2.5%
Third ($59K - $71k) 1.9%
Fourth ($71K - $91k) 1.3%
Fifth ($91K + ) 0.9%
2.4 Impact and Cost Effectiveness
While it is clear that a Vehicle Emissions Inspection Program does induce some
vehicle owners to make emissions reducing repairs, what is the overall effect of the
program? Further, if vehicle inspection programs do reduce emissions, are the emis-
sions reductions high enough to justify the cost of the program? These questions are
explored in this section.
2.4.1 Impact
The total reduction in emissions from a VEIP is not straightforward to calculate.
This is because the majority of vehicles inspected are tested by reading data from
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the vehicle’s On-Board Diagnostic (OBD) system. OBD tests do not provide data on
emissions levels of the vehicle, but only report binary data on whether the vehicle’s
engine monitoring systems are in working order, and whether certain values have
stayed within a required range.
While the OBD tests does not provide a direct measures of pollution, it does
have many advantages. It is more comprehensive than a tailpipe emissions test.
A vehicle’s OBD system continuously monitors up to 11 emissions control related
subsystems. If more than one of these subsystems malfunctions, or if certain values
related to emissions ever exceed predetermined limits, the vehicle cannot pass an
OBD emissions inspection without repairs. It is also a faster, more convenient test.
In the Arizona data, OBD tests took 93 seconds on average, while IM147 tests took
243 seconds.
While the OBD test does have the advantages discussed above, it also has disad-
vantages. As a computer-to-computer test, there is opportunity for fraud. Numerous
websites offer software that will fraudulently eliminate diagnostic trouble codes. Volk-
swagen is infamously known for installing software that interfered with OBD tests;
the Volkswagen software would not have interfered with a tailpipe emissions test.
There is also concern over lack of overlap between the set of vehicles that fail the
OBD test and those that fail a tailpipe emissions test (Canada 2004).
Despite these concerns, OBD is the standard method used by states that run
a Vehicle Inspection/Maintenance program to test the majority of vehicles. As the
percent of the vehicle fleet newer than 1996 model year increases over time, the portion
of vehicle inspections done using the OBD test will increase.
Fortunately, a portion of the vehicles in this study were tested using the IM147
test, which measures levels of pollutants emitted by the vehicle. This allows for a
direct calculation of pollution reduction on these vehicles. The method currently used
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by the EPA for measuring emissions reduction relies on differencing the pollution level
of vehicles that fail the IM147 emissions inspection and the pollution level of those
same vehicles when they pass a retest. The formula used, in units of grams per
vehicle-mile, is
∆iyc =
∑ pfailiyc
xfailyc
−∑ pretestiyc
xretestyc
Nyc
(2.2)
In (2.2), i ∈ {HC,CO,NOx} is the measured pollutant, y ∈ [1981, 1995] is vehicle
model year, c ∈ {light duty vehicles, light trucks, medium trucks} is a broad category
of vehicle size, p is the total grams of pollutant emitted during the test, x is the miles
driven during the test, and N is the number of vehicles in the bin.
Figure 2.4 shows average emissions reductions per vehicle-mile for each of the
three measured pollutants across model years. No data is reported for model year
1996-2008 vehicles because they are inspected using the OBD test which does not
provide emissions data.
Note that the data presented in Figure 2.4 only includes vehicles older than 1996
model year that fail the initial inspection and pass a subsequent inspection. This
represents 1% of all vehicles inspections during the study period, and only 6% of
the set of vehicles that fail the first test and pass a subsequent test. It also ignores
the effect of the program on individuals who make emission reducing vehicle repairs
before the first emissions inspection. This, however, may not be a bad assumption
since retesting is free. An owner has incentive to try to pass an emissions inspection
before paying for repairs.
Filling in the missing data for model year 1996-2008 requires an assumption. I
assume that a smoothly varying inspection pass rate across model years equates to a
smoothly varying emissions reduction across model years. The inspection pass rate
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Figure 2.4: Reduction of pollutant by model year. CO is on right axis.
varies smoothly both across model year at one point in time, and across time in one
model year. Figure 2.2 shows that the inspection pass rate varies smoothly across
model year for the 2013-2014 emissions testing cycle. Figure 2.5 shows that 15-, 16-,
and 17-year-old vehicles have a smoothly varying inspection pass rate across time and
test types.
While there is a discontinuous change in emissions monitoring technology between
1995 and 1996 model years, there is no discontinuous change in emissions abatement
technology. This is further evidence that emissions reduction levels might vary con-
tinuously across model years.
Admittedly, the assumption used to fill in the missing 1996-2008 data is important
to the results of this section. A few alternative assumptions, such as applying the 1995
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Figure 2.5: Inspection pass rate for 15-, 16-, 17-year-old vehicles across time. The
smooth portion of the line means the vehicle was inspected with the IM147 test; the
dotted portion means the vehicle was inspected using the OBD test.
reduction level to all subsequent model years, were explored. The results presented
here are quite robust to the assumption used.
Figure 2.4 shows that in each of the three measured pollutants, there is a trend
across model years, upward for NOx, and downward for HC and CO. I use OLS to
estimate the trend and extrapolate emissions reduction levels for 1996-2008 model
years from the 1981-1995 data. A simple data generating process with good fit is
ln(∆iy) = β0 + β1y (2.3)
where ∆ is measured emissions reduction, i ∈ {HC,CO,NOx}, and y ∈ [1981, 1995]
is vehicle model year. Here β0 is a level parameter and β1 is an exponential de-
cay/growth parameter. Data is weighted by number of vehicles in each model year.
Using the estimated parameters β˜0 and β˜1, and the data generating process as-
sumption, I extrapolate expected emissions reduction for y ∈ [1996, 2008] model years.
21
Figure 2.6: Extrapolated reduction of pollutant for model years 1996-2008. CO is
on right axis.
Figure 2.6 shows the OLS fitted trend line and extrapolated values for each of the
three pollutants in all relevant model years.
With values for each model year, estimating the impact of the Arizona VEIP
is straightforward. In Table 2.4.1, the per-vehicle-mile reduction in pollutant is es-
timated by taking a weighted average of emissions reductions for each model year
1981-2008, weighting each model year by the number of vehicles that fail an inspec-
tion and then later pass for that model year. If I assume each repaired vehicle is
driven the national average of 13,500 miles per year, I can calculate the annual im-
pact of the Arizona program in units of tons of pollutant per year. This is also shown
in Table 2.4.1. For scale, the last column of Table 2.4.1 shows that the VEIP induced
reduction of NOx is approximately 8% of the total NOx emission from on-road vehi-
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Table 2.7: Reduction in grams per vehicle mile of Hydrocarbons (HC), Carbon
Monoxide (CO), and Oxides of Nitrogen (NOx).
Extrapolated Impact Reduction
Pollutant Reduction (tons/year) (% of total)
HC 1.28 g/veh-mi 1612
CO 14.5 g/veh-mi 18277
NOx 3.57 g/veh-mi 4512 7.96%
cles in the Phoenix 8-hour ozone non-attainment area, as reported by the Maricopa
County Air Quality Department.
2.4.2 Cost and Benefit
The monetary cost of the Arizona Vehicle Emissions Inspection Program is given
in the data. Monetary costs come from two sources: the fee for taking the test and the
cost of vehicle repairs. The test fee is approximately $20 per vehicle and is reported
in the data. The cost of repairs is self-reported by the vehicle owner when a vehicle
is brought back to the testing station for a retest. Time costs, psychological costs, or
other intangible costs are not included in the data.
The average total annual cost for the 2013-2014 testing cycle is $36 million from
testing fees and $12.6 million from reported vehicle repair costs. Only 17.1% of retests
report any repair costs. This could be because the owner obtained free repairs, or
because the owner chose not to report the cost of repair. Because of this, the number
reported for repair costs represents a lower bound. The average repair cost for owners
that reported a non-zero repair cost is $203 per vehicle. If I assume that the average
repair cost applies to all repairs with a zero reported repair cost, then the total cost of
repairs is $73.4 million and the total program cost is $109.5 million. Cost information
is summarized in Table 2.8.
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Table 2.8: Annual cost, averaged across the 2013-2014 testing cycle, of the Arizona
Vehicle Emissions Inspection Program.
Average Annual Cost $48,449,512
Test fee $35,861,995 74%
Repair cost $12,587,517 26%
Table 2.9: Assumed benefits from a reduction of one ton of each measured pollutant.
Prices in 2014 dollars.
Pollutant Benefit Source
Hydrocarbons $1,141/ton EPA, social cost of methane
Carbon Monoxide $41/ton EPA, social cost of carbon
Oxides of Nitrogen (Phoenix) $6,824/ton AP2 model, ground level
Oxides of Nitrogen (Tucson) $2,675/ton AP2 model, ground level
To calculate the benefit of the program, I use measures of social costs of pollutants
from various published sources. The Environmental Protection Agency reports a
social cost of carbon and a social cost of methane. I assume these costs represent
the social benefit of a reduction in emissions of carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons,
respectively. While methane is not the only hydrocarbon measured in the emissions
tests, it is the closest proxy for which there is a published social cost. To measure the
social benefit of a reduction in NOx, I use the Muller, Mendelsohn, Nordhaus (2011)
AP2 model. The AP2 model gives a county-specific estimate of the marginal social
damages of NOx.
The AP2 model assumes a $2 million value of statistical life (VSL), while the
models used by the EPA have an implicit VSL assumption of approximately $7 mil-
lion. All values are in 2014 dollars. Because VSL is a units conversion parameter
in this exercise, I rescaled the values in the AP2 model to match a $7 million VSL
assumption. These benefit value assumptions are summarized in Table 2.9.
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Table 2.10: Benefit/Cost ratio of the Arizona Vehicle Emissions Inspection Program.
City Benefit/Cost Ratio Break-even VSL
(1) (2)
Phoenix 1.01 0.22 $6.9 M
Tucson 0.45 0.10 $15.7 M
To calculate the benefit/cost ratio of the Arizona VEIP, I multiply annual emis-
sions reductions by social benefit, and divide by total cost of the program. In Table
2.10, I report an upper and lower bound. The upper bound (reported as column (1)
in Table 2.10) is calculated assuming that VSL is $7 million and that reported repair
costs represent all repair costs. The lower bound (reported as column (2) in Table
2.10) is calculated assuming VSL is $3.5 million and that the average vehicle repair
cost of $203 was the true repair cost for each vehicle that did not report a repair cost.
My preferred value for the Benefit/Cost ratio comes from assuming VSL is $7 million,
and that reported repair costs represent all repair costs. In this case, $100 spent on
the VEIP in Phoenix produces $44 of social benefit, and $100 spent on the VEIP in
Tucson produces $20 in social benefit. Adding time costs, psychological costs, and
other intangible costs would further drive the benefit/cost ratio down.
In the final column of Table 2.10, I report the VSL assumption needed for the
VEIP to break even, meaning the measured social cost of the program is equal to the
measured social benefit. In this case, I assume that reported repair costs represent
actual repair costs. In Tucson, break-even VSL is $15.7 million and in Phoenix it is
$6.9 million. These numbers are approximately twice as big if I apply the average
vehicle repair cost to all vehicles with a reported repair cost of zero. These results
imply that it is difficult to justify the VEIP in Tucson based on a benefit/cost analysis.
The Phoenix program is only justifiable under generous assumptions.
25
2.5 The Future of Emissions Testing
I have shown that the Arizona VEIP has a measured social cost higher than the
measured social benefit. I have also shown that it is regressive, constraining the
repair choices of the poor more than the wealthy. In this section, I ask the question,
”How can the emissions inspection program be improved?” I define improvement as
either (i) the measured cost is decreased relative to the measured benefit or (ii) the
regressivity of the program is muted. The wealth of data about both vehicles and
owners of those vehicles makes exploring such improvements possible.
2.5.1 Improving Cost/Benefit
Different vehicle types have different pollution profiles (see Figure 2.6), different
repair costs, and different inspection passage rates. Suppose the vehicle emissions
inspection requirement were only imposed on those vehicle-type bins that have calcu-
lated social benefit higher than cost. For example, one could evaluate the benefit/cost
ratio of a bin of 1995 Light-Duty Nissan Trucks. The results of evaluating the ben-
efit/cost ratio of each possible vehicle-type bin are difficult to present in readable
tables, but are unsurprising. Old, American-made vehicle bins tend to higher bene-
fit/cost ratios.
It is not difficult, however, to present a series of benefit/cost analyses on vehicle-
type bins discretized by only one vehicle characteristic. Considering the political
feasibility of exempting some vehicles from inspection, perhaps model year is an
acceptable stratification of vehicle-type bins. The five newest model years are already
exempt from inspection.
Using the data on the 2013-2014 emissions inspection cycle, I ask, ”Which model
years would have been exempted from testing because the cost of testing that model
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Figure 2.7: Benefit to cost ratio by vehicle model year. Assumes VSL is $7 million,
reported repair costs represent all repair costs, and uses the extrapolation method for
calculating emissions reduction for model years 1996-2008.
year exceeded the social benefit?” I use the benefit assumptions described in Table
2.9, a VSL of $7M, and only reported repair costs. I also assume that a counter-
factual emissions inspection policy would have had no effect on the composition of
the vehicle fleet, the repair decisions of owners, or the average annual miles driven.
The results are summarized in Figure 2.7.
In this counter-factual policy, all vehicles would be exempt from inspection in
Tucson because the measured benefit of inspection does not exceed the estimated
social cost for each model year. In Phoenix, vehicles newer than model year 2002
would be exempt from inspection. The difference between Tucson and Phoenix arises
because the marginal benefit of decreasing NOx emissions is lower in Tucson than in
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Phoenix, as is shown in Table 2.9.
This result has policy implications. Policymakers could increase the benefit/cost
ratio of the Arizona VEIP by canceling the Tucson program and exempting the 11
newest model years from inspection in Phoenix. Because of the downward trend in
benefit/cost ratio across model years, exempting the newest model years is likely to
have a positive effect on benefit/cost ratio of VEIPs.
2.5.2 Improving Regressivity
How could a vehicle emissions inspection program provide targeted help to vehicle
owners with the lowest annual income? Directly subsidizing individuals based on
income is difficult both politically and administratively. However, patterns of vehicle
ownership may help. Data tells us the older vehicles fail vehicle inspections more often
than newer vehicles, and that lower annual income people own a higher percentage
of these older vehicles on average. Figure 2.8 shows the percentage of vehicles owned
by people in each quintile of the income distribution. There is a trend that the
lowest income quintiles own a larger share of older vehicles that the highest income
quintiles. Therefore, a program designed to subsidize the inspection of older vehicles
would benefit those with lower annual income more than those with higher annual
income.
Currently, most vehicles older than five model years must pass inspection to be
registered for road use. When a vehicle is due to be inspected, the owner is sent a
letter informing her that she must drive to a testing center, pay a fee, and pass an
emissions inspection to maintain her vehicle registration.
Consider a change to the emissions inspection program where some vehicles are
exempt from testing, but still must pay the fee, and other vehicles are exempt from
paying the fee, but still must pass the inspection. Specifically, owners of newer model
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Figure 2.8: Percent vehicle ownership by income quintile. Lowest income is q1. The
highest income quintile owns a greater percent of newer cars than older cars.
year vehicles that have a very low emissions inspection failure rate are sent a letter
stating that they must pay the emissions inspection fee, but do not need to have
their vehicle inspected. The owner is better off by saving the time and hassle of the
emissions inspection, and society is not harmed because the social cost of inspecting
these newer vehicles is higher than the social benefit (as shown in section 2.5.1 herein).
Owners of older vehicles that have higher emissions inspection failure rates are
sent a letter requiring an emissions inspection, but the inspection is free (subsidized
by the fee paid by the owners of newer vehicles). The owner is better off because
he does not have to pay the inspection fee, and society is not harmed because older,
high polluting vehicles are still inspected and repaired.
Because people with lower annual income are more likely to own old vehicles
29
on average, this proposed ”anti-Pigovian” tax and transfer system not only would
improve the progressivity of the vehicle emissions inspection program, but also is a
Pareto improvement!
The number of newer model year vehicles is many times higher than the number
of older model year vehicles in the Arizona fleet. Exempting only one new model year
from testing could pay for the inspections of many older model year vehicles. For
example, exempting only 2008 model year vehicles would subsidize the inspection of
all 1981-1995 model year vehicles. Or, exempting 2003-2008 model years would pay
for all 1981-2002 inspections.
Under current policy, the lowest income quintile pays for 16.2% of total program
costs (fees plus reported repair costs) in Phoenix. If 2008 model year vehicles were
exempt from inspection, and the fee for that model year were used to subsidize the
inspection of 1981-1995 model year vehicles, the lowest income quintile would pay
15.5% of total program costs. The best that this transfer system could do would be
to exempt enough model years so that all other model years are subsidized. In that
case, model years 2003 and newer would be exempt, and the lowest income quintile
would pay only 12.6% of program costs.
2.6 Conclusion
I have shown that the Arizona Vehicle Emissions Inspection Program is regressive
in that it constrains the vehicle repair decision of people with lower annual income
more than people with higher annual income. Individuals with a lower annual income
are both (i) more likely to drive vehicles that fail the inspection at a higher average
rate, and (ii) more likely to fail an inspection conditional on vehicle characteristics.
This result is significant because it informs policy. A vehicle emissions abatement
policy based on emissions monitoring will disproportionately constrain the vehicle
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repair choices of those with lower annual income. Further, a program designed to up-
date or repair the fleet of vehicles will have a different impact on pollution depending
on the characteristics of the owners of the vehicles targeted.
I have also shown that the Arizona VEIP does reduce emissions, but that the social
benefit of the program does not exceed social cost in Tucson, and requires generous
assumptions to exceed social cost in Phoenix. Even using generous assumptions, the
social benefit of the program does not exceed social cost for model year 2003 and newer
vehicles in Phoenix. This implies that exempting newer model year vehicles from
VEIP program requirements could be an effective means of increasing the benefit/cost
ratio of these programs.
Further, because people with lower annual income own a disproportionately high
percent of older vehicles, an inspection/repair subsidy program that discriminates
based on vehicle model year is a politically and administratively feasible way aid
owners with lower annual income. As of this writing, Arizona began testing a program
in which owners of vehicles older than 12 model years that failed inspection can receive
a subsidy for vehicle repairs (ARS 49-474.03). Investigating the results of this trial
program could yield interesting results.
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Chapter 3
FIAT VALUE IN THE THEORY OF VALUE
with Edward C. Prescott
We explore monetary policy in a world without currency. In our world, money
is a form of government debt that bears interest, which can be negative as well as
positive. Services of money are a factor of production. We show that the national
accounts must be revised in this world. Using our baseline economy, we determine the
balanced growth paths for a set of money interest rate target policy regimes. Besides
this interest rate, the only policy variable that differs across regimes is either the
labor income tax rate or the inflation rate. We find that Friedman monetary satiation
without deflation is possible. We also examine a set of inflation rate targeting regimes.
Here, the only other policy variable that differs across policy regimes is the tax rate.
There is a sequence of markets with outcome in each market being a Debreu valuation
equilibrium, which determines the vector of assets and liabilities households take into
the subsequent period. Evaluating a policy regime is an advanced exercise in public
finance. Monetary satiation is not optimal even though money is costless to produce.
32
3.1 Introduction
Information processing technology is rapidly advancing and is changing the nature
of the payment system. Currency is being used less and less to carry out transactions
and to serve as a store of value. Indeed, a currency-less monetary system has become
feasible and may be implemented. All monetary systems need a unit of value and the
transition to a currency-less system would necessitate the creation of fiat value. A
question is whether or not moving to a fiat-value monetary system is socially desirable.
This paper is a step towards addressing this important social question.
The equilibrium concept used in this study is Debreu (1954) valuation equilibrium.
The commodity space in his framework is restricted only to being a linear topological
space. In this study, there is a sequence of valuation equilibria with the households
entering a period with stocks of assets and liabilities. In the accounting period,
economic outcomes are a valuation equilibrium. These outcomes among other things
specify the stocks of assets and liabilities that households take into the subsequent
accounting period. This is the way that the data are reported. These data are used
to construct the national income and product accounts, and balance sheets of the
household and government sectors.
Large amounts of cash reserves are held by businesses. The amount relative to
GDP is of the order of 1.3 annual GDP. Businesses hold these low return assets for
a reason, namely the services they provide. This leads us to treat the services of the
money as a factor of production, or input to the aggregate production functions. Our
production function is consistent with the money demand function when nominal
interest rates are positive. It is also consistent with extended or even permanent
periods of zero nominal interest rates. With the fiat value monetary system considered
here, there is no currency, and for some policy regimes, the nominal interest rate paid
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on the money stock is negative and the real natural interest rate is positive.
A parametric set of neoclassical growth economies is considered. The benchmark
economy is selected to match selected facts displayed by the pre-2008 US economy
given the values of the policy parameters in that period. For a set of policy regimes,
the steady state of the benchmark economy is determined and comparisons made.
These regimes include interest rate targeting policy regimes and inflation rate tar-
geting regimes. For the interest rate regimes both the inflation rate and the tax rate
cannot be constant across regimes. We consider both a set of regimes for which the
inflation rate is the same and the tax rate is different and a set of regimes for which
the tax rate is the same and the inflation rate is different. One finding is that in our
currency-less monetary system there can be Friedman satiation with positive inflation
target regimes. This is possible because there is no currency that can be used as a
store of value. Another finding is that monetary and fiscal policy cannot be com-
pletely separated. With the inflation targeting regimes, the tax rate on labor income
is endogenous. This is because with interest rate targeting, the inflation rate has
consequences for the government budget identity. We find that evaluating monetary
policy is an advanced exercise in public finance.
In our model economies, there is a complete separation of the payment/transaction
monetary system from the asset-management function system of the financial sector.
Effectively it is a 100 percent reserve system. There are no financial businesses that
borrow from one group at a low rate and lend to another at a higher rate, at least for
limited liability businesses. There, of course, are financial businesses that pool and
manage assets of households and their businesses. The investors share in the returns.
This is the way that most of the financing of businesses is currently done in the United
States. In our model world, there are no gains from having institutions that accept
demand deposits and originate loans in order to make maturity transformation. There
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are no social gains from having fractional reserves. Further, there is no too-big-to-fail
problem for financial institutions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 specifies the parametric set of neoclas-
sical growth model economies used in this study. Section 3 specifies the benchmark
economy in this set which is specified by the policy, demographic, preference, and
technology parameters. This economy is the model economy in our set that matches
the pre-2008 US economy on selected dimensions. Section 4 transforms the variables
in the standard way so that there is steady-state in the transformed variables. Only
policies are considered for which there is a steady-state. For any such policy there is
a unique steady-state equilibrium. Section 5 compares the balanced growth path for
three sets of policy regimes. A policy is characterized by the values of seven variables.
For a policy regime set, one of the seven variables is the target variable and one vari-
able is endogenous across regimes. For three sets of policy regimes the steady states
are determined. One has a money interest rate target with the tax rate endogenous.
Another has a money interest rate target with the inflation rate endogenous. The
third set has an inflation rate target with the tax rate endogenous. Section 6 discusses
advantages and possible problems with the currency-less monetary system. Section
7 has some concluding comments.
3.2 The Model Economy
The analysis is steady-state and there is no uncertainty or growth in living stan-
dards. Consequently it does not matter whether an overlapping generation or an
infinitely-lived household abstraction is used. We use the infinitely-lived abstraction
because it is easier to use.
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3.2.1 Preferences
There is a measure 1 of identical households with preferences ordered by
∞∑
t=0
βt[log(ct) + αlog(1− ht)] (3.1)
where ct > 0 is consumption and ht ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of the time endowment
allocated to the market. The parameter β = 1/(1 + ρ) ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor
and ρ is the discount rate. The parameter α determines the relative shares of ct and
the leisure fraction (1− ht).
For the balanced growth pather with balanced growth rate γ, the steady-state real
interest rate is
i = γ + ρ+ γρ (3.2)
This fact will be exploited when characterizing the steady state for policies for which
it exists.
Households hold two stocks of assets that they rent to the business sector. These
stocks are non-human capital kt and (real) money mt. They also hold nominal gov-
ernment bonds, Bt. Therefore, the households’ stock of real government bonds is
bt = Bt/Pt. These three stocks are the households’ state variables. Households also
supply labor services ht to the business section.
3.2.2 Price Level and Inflation
There is a sequence of values of the composite output good in units of money.
This is the definition of the price level Pt at date t. We break with tradition and
define the date t inflation rate to be
pit =
Pt+1 − Pt
Pt
(3.3)
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We do this because it simplifies and unifies notation. When constructing the real
value of a variable - whether it is a stock, flows, or prices - we simply divide its
nominal value by by Pt.
3.2.3 Technology
Technology advances at rate γ and is labor augmenting. Inputs to the business
sector are the services of non-human capital kt, the services of human capital ht, and
the services on real money stock mt. The structure of the production function is as
follows. Let z be an aggregate of the tangible and human capital services where
zt = k
θ
t ((1 + γ)
t)h1−θt (3.4)
For these two capital stocks, one unit of stock provides one unit of services. We
use h and k to denote both stocks and service flows.
The aggregate production function is
yt =

Azφtm
1−φ
t if mt < λzt
Aλ1−φzt if mt ≥ λzt
(3.5)
The aggregate production function is increasing, concave, and displays constant
returns to scale. The marginal product of m is zero if m ≥ λz. Figure 3.1 depicts an
isoquant of the aggregate production function.
3.2.4 Budget Constraints
Household
The assets held by the household are money, government debt, and capital. The
inflation rate, possibly negative, is pi; government lump-sum transfers in cash or in
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Figure 3.1: A Production Function Isoquant
kind are ψ; rk and rm are the rental price of capital k and real cash balances m; ib
and im are the interest rates paid on the two forms of government debt. A primed
variable is the next period value of that variable. With these notational conventions,
the household budget constraint is
c+x+m′(1 +pi) + b′(1 +pi) = (1− τ)wh+ rkk+ rmm+ ibb+ imm+ b+m+ψ (3.6)
where x is capital investment given by
x = k′ − (1− δ)k (3.7)
This states that expenditures are for consumption, investment, currency acquisi-
tion, and government debt acquisition and that the receipts are equal to the after-tax
labor income, rental income on (non-human) capital k, rental income on money, inter-
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est payments on the two forms of government debt, and lump-sum transfers received
from the government.
We use capital letters to denote nominal quantities. In nominal terms, the date t
households budget constraint is
Ct+Xt+Mt+1+Bt+1 = (1−τt)Wtht+rkKt+rmMt+ibBt+imMt+Bt+Mt+Ψt (3.8)
Here Xt is investment so Kt+1 = Kt +Xt − δKt.
Firm
Given constant returns to scale, revenue is equal to costs, or
y = wh+ rkk + rmm (3.9)
Government
The government’s pure public consumption is g. The interest rates on the two types
of government debt are im and ib. The government’s budget constraint (expenditures
equal revenue plus deficit) is
g + ψ + imm+ ibb = τwh+ [m
′(1 + pi)−m] + [b′(1 + pi)− b] (3.10)
Equivalently, the government budget constraint, using capital letters to denote
nominal quantities, is
Gt + Ψt + imtMt + ibtBt = τWtht + (Mt+1 −Mt) + (Bt+1 −Bt) (3.11)
3.2.5 Equilibrium
Prices are {wt, rkt, rmt, ibt, imt}∞t=0. Equilibrium conditions are
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1. Households choose an optimal sequence of {ct, ht, kt+1,mt+1, bt+1}∞t=0 given prices
and their budget constraints.
2. Firms choose the value maximizing {ht, kt,mt} given period t factor rental
prices.
3. The government selection of {gt, ψt, τt,mt+1, bt+1, imt, pit}∞t=0 is such that its bud-
get constraints for all t, given prices and the household’s decision variables, are
satisfied.
Comment 1: The firm faces a sequence of static problems.
Comment 2: The list of elements specifying government policy includes both the
prices and the quantities of money it issues. It will not be possible to target both the
price and the quantity of money.
3.3 Balanced Growth Analysis
The state of the household is its holdings at the beginning of the period of real
money stock, real government debt stock, and real capital stock. One important point
is that interest rates are nominal. Nominal values of stocks and flows grow at the
rate of inflation. Prices, with the exception of the interest rates on government bonds
and money, grow at the inflation rate.
There are 19 variables to be determined. They are:
{w, rk, rm, ib, im, h, k,m, b, k′,m′, b′, g, ψ, τ, pi, φg, φb, φψ}.
The following set of equilibrium conditions are necessary and sufficient for a
steady-state for a given policy, and are used to find the steady-state.
From the firms maximization problem: Three marginal conditions are that the
marginal products (MP) of the factors of production are equal to their rental prices.
There is the zero profit condition given constant return to scale. Aggregate feasibility
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is another condition.
E1: MPk = rk
E2: MPh = w
E3: MPm = rm
E4: c+ x+ g = rkk + rmm+ wh
E5: y = c+ x+ g
There is an issue as to what the marginal product of money is when m/z = λ
as the production function is not differentiable at points along that line. The MP
of money is bounded away from zero above the line and is zero below the line. The
derivative from below is the value of the MP of money for points on this line.
Variable y is output of the business sector and does not include the government
production of money.
From the households maximization problem: the intra-temporal marginal condi-
tion that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure is equal
to the ratio of their after tax prices. The inter-temporal condition is that the marginal
rate of substitution between this and next period’s consumptions equals the ration of
their prices. These conditions are:
E6: αc/(1− h) = (1− τ)w
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E7: 1 + rk = (1 + γ)(1 + ρ) + δ
E8: 1 + ib = (1 + pi)(1 + ρ)(1 + γ)
E9: ib = im + rm
E10: c + [k′ − (1 − δ)k] + m′(1 + pi) + b′(1 + pi) = (1 − τ)wh + rkk + (1 + im +
rm)m+ (1 + ib)b+ ψ
E8 and E9 are no arbitrage conditions. Because there is no uncertainty, the
household return on money and government bonds must be equal, and the return on
government bonds must be equal to return on investing in k.
Balanced growth requires:
E11: b′ = (1 + γ)b
E12: m′ = (1 + γ)m
E13: k′ = (1 + γ)k
There is the law of motion of capital is
E14: k′ = x+ (1− δ)k + x
In each of the sequence of valuation equilibria, there are three government pol-
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icy constraints and a government budget constraint (expenditure equals revenue plus
deficit):
E15: g = φgy
E16: ψ = φψy
E17: b = φby
E18: g + ψ + imm+ ibb = τwh+ [m
′(1 + pi)−m] + b′(1 + pi)− b]
The set of policy variables is {im,m/y, τ, pi}. Values for two of these four variables
are chosen. A restriction is that variables im and m/y are not both chosen. This adds
two equations to our set of necessary equations. Thus there are 20 equations in 19
unknowns. By Walrus Law, one of the budget constraints is redundant.
3.3.1 Baseline Economy for Steady-State Analyses
A parametric set of economies has been specified. For the baseline economy, a
parameter vector is chosen so that the baseline economy has a balanced growth that
roughly matches the U.S. economy in consumption and investment shares, fraction of
time worked, asset stocks to output ratios, factor income shares, inflation rate, and
after-tax return on capital. Table 3.1 displays the national accounts for our chosen
baseline economy. The annual growth rate is 3 percent.
The size of the stock of money may seem large. The 1.5 times annual GNP stock
is much larger than M2, which is about 0.6. As pointed out by Williamson [2012],
two types of money are used for transaction purposes. Much of the liquid government
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Table 3.1: National accounts for the baseline economy.
Product and Income Accounts
Product 1.08
Household Consumption 0.68
Government Consumption 0.05
Capital Investment 0.27
Money Investment 0.08
Income 1.08
Wages 0.64
Depreciation of Capital 0.15
Capital Rental Income 0.19
Money Rental Income 0.01
Central Bank Profits 0.08
Government Accounts
Receipts 0.43
Tax Revenue 0.33
Money Issuance 0.08
Debt Issuance 0.03
Expenditures 0.43
Government Consumption 0.05
Transfers to Household 0.25
Bond Services 0.04
Money Services 0.10
Asset Stocks
Capital 3.81
Money 1.50
Bonds 0.50
Other
Hours Fraction 0.40
Labor Share 0.64
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debt is held as cash reserves, and in 2015 the nominal return on this debt in the major
advanced industrial countries was near zero. Businesses make large payments using
the shadow banking sector and small payments using the commercial banking system.
The proposed arrangement has only one type of money.
Because money services are a factor of production, the national accounts must
be revised so that they are consistent with the theoretical framework being used.
Money, like capital, provides services to the business sector; therefore, there must
be a Money Rental Income entry on the income side of the accounts and a Money
Investment entry on the product side of the accounts. The government costlessly
produces money and earns monopoly profits. These profits are entered on the income
side of the national accounts as the entry Central Bank Profits.
Table 3.2 displays the set of government policy parameters for the baseline econ-
omy. Note that the total factor productivity (TFP) parameter A is chosen for con-
venience so that y is one, and thus levels and levels relative to y are the same in the
baseline economy. Also, the value of the satiation parameter λ is somewhat arbitrary.
It was set high enough so that the baseline economy is not satiated with money. Table
3.3 lists the calibrated values of the preference and technology parameters.
3.4 Three Explorations
In this section, we will explore the consequences of various monetary policy regimes
under our alternative financial system. Our assessment is that technology has changed
sufficiently so that existing monetary theory does not provide predictions as to the
consequences of monetary policy regimes. Currently, there is public discussion as to
whether the interest rate should be increased and what the inflation rate target should
be. Exploration 1 will explore the consequences of various money supplyor, equiva-
lently, money interest ratepolicy regimes. Exploration 2 will explore the consequences
45
Table 3.2: Policy parameter values for the baseline economy
Policy Parameters
g/y government public goods share 0.05
ψ/y transfer share 0.25
m/y money-output ratio 1.5
b/y privately held debt gov. debt to output 0.5
τ labor tax rate 0.52
im interest rate on money 6.54 %
ib interest rate on gov. debt 7.21 %
pi inflation rate (annual %) 2.00 %
Table 3.3: Preference and technology values for baseline economy
Preference/Technology Parameter
α relative preference for leisure 0.68
β discount rate (annual) 0.98
δ depreciation rate (annual) 0.04
θ capital cost share 0.35
φ money cost share 0.01
A TFP 1.13
46
of various inflation rate targeting regimes.
For this analysis, we focus only on monetary policy and therefore minimize the role
of fiscal policy. This is done by keeping fiscal policy parameters as fixed as possible.
Thus, the lump-sum transfers and the size of public goods consumption relative to
output are held fixed. We also keep the value of non-monetary government debt
at a fixed fraction of output. The inflation rate has tax consequences; this requires
that the labor tax rate be endogenous when comparing the balanced growth paths of
policies with different inflation rates. The three remaining policy variables enter the
government budget constraint and therefore have some fiscal consequences.
For our explorations, the set of government policy variables includes the inflation
rate, the tax rate, and the interest paid on money. In each exploration, two of these
policy variables are fixed, and two are endogenous.
Our measure of welfare across policy regimes is consumption equivalent (CE)
welfare. We report the percentage change in consumption that must be given to an
individual to make him indifferent among worlds with different policy regimes. We
acknowledge that this measure of welfare is a steady-state comparison for one type
and does not take into account transitional concerns. But given that the ratio of non-
human capital to output is the same for all balanced growth paths, the consequences
of transition for the policy regimes comparisons we consider should be small.
3.4.1 Exploration 1 - Money Supply with Endogenous Tax Rate Regimes
In response to the recession of 2008, those who make U.S. monetary policy have
experimented with new monetary policy approaches. One of these approaches was
quantitative easing, which increased the Federal Reserves assets and liabilities fourfold
to over 4 trillion USD. The other approach was paying interest on excess reserves,
which was permitted beginning in 2008. These experiments resulted in a large increase
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in private sector deposits and therefore in the money supply.
For the set of regimes considered in this exploration, the following policy variables
are held constant at the following values:
{g/y = 0.05, ψ/y = 0.25, b/y = 0.3}
The government spends 5 percent of output and transfers 25 percent of output.
The stock of government debt is 50 percent of output. This system keeps fiscal policy
as fixed as possible.
The set of policy variables whose value varies across the regimes considered is
{im,m/y, pi, τ}
Two of these policy variables are held fixed, and two are endogenous. In the
model, money stock and interest on money are tied together and cannot be chosen
independently. Given the production function and preferences, the real or natural
interest rate is determined. Given in addition to the inflation rate, the nominal
interest rates of interest on the two forms of government debt as well as the real
rental price of money are determined. From the production function laid out in
full detail in the Appendix, the m/y ratio is determined. First, we explore interest
on money policies. The inflation rate is held fixed at 2 percent. The tax rate varies
endogenously in order to have government expenditures equal to government receipts.
Figure 3.2 shows that a higher tax rate is associated with a higher interest rate
on money. Increasing the interest on money increases the stock of money relative to
output. Thus, the total interest paid to owners of money is larger. Since the inflation
rate is fixed, a higher labor tax rate is needed for government expenditure to be equal
to the sum of government receipts and the deficit. With these policy regimes, the
deficit-to-output ratio is fixed.
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Figure 3.2: Labor tax rates for different interest rate targets
Figure 3.3 shows that there is a steady-state welfare-maximizing interest rate on
money. A regime with a higher interest rate on money has a larger money services
input to aggregate production. However, a higher interest rate regime also has a
smaller labor input to aggregate production. For low interest rate regimes, the output
increases because the larger money service input exceeds the output reduction arising
from lower labor supply. For high interest rate regimes, output decreases because
the reduction in output from lower labor supply exceeds the increase in output from
larger money services. Figure 3 shows that, for our model economy, welfare is highest
in a world where the interest rate on money is approximately 6 percent.
The nominal interest rate on government bonds is 7.2 percent. Why would the
welfare-maximizing interest rate policy regime not completely eliminate the gap be-
tween the interest on money and bonds; that is, why is monetary satiation not op-
timal? Because we have fixed inflation and government spending, a labor tax rate
change is needed for balance in the government accounts.
This highlights the importance of fiscal response to monetary policy. In a regime
that targets the inflation rate, fiscal policy must respond to changes in interest rate
policy.
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Figure 3.3: Steady-state welfare indicator for various interest rate targets
3.4.2 Monetary Policy Regimes with Endogenous Inflation
Next, we explore money stock policy regimes. We fix the labor tax rate at 52
percent and allow the inflation rate to vary endogenously to ensure that government
expenditures are equal to government receipts. We consider money stock policies
associated with both satiation and non-satiation.
Figure 3.4 shows that a larger money stock regimes has a higher steady-state wel-
fare. However, increasing the money stock increases welfare only up to the satiation
point, beyond which increasing the money stock does not increase welfare. For policy
regimes with satiation, money and government debt are equivalent. In these regimes,
money plus government debt is a constant, and consequently there is an unimportant
indeterminacy.
In Figure ??, we see that for satiated money stock regimes, the rental price of
money services is zero. For these regimes, the marginal product of money is equal
to the marginal cost of producing money (assumed to be zero). Interest rates on
money and bonds are equal, and money and bonds are identical government debt
instruments.
In the United States, policies that increase the money stock are enacted by the
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Figure 3.4: Steady-state welfare indicator for various money stock regimes
central bank purchasing government bonds from banks in exchange for money. Since
money and bonds are identical in satiated economies, the split of total government
debt between money and bonds is indeterminate. In the satiated region, the sum of
money and bonds is constant.
The Friedman rule leads to satiation in economies in which money is not a factor of
production. The Friedman rule is to deflate at the real interest rate [Friedman, 1960].
The return on currency is then equal to the return on capital. In the monetary system
considered here, we eliminate the inefficiency not by deflating at the real interest rate
but by choosing a money stock regime that leads to a satiated economy. We call this
state Friedman satiation.
When money is a factor of production, Friedman satiation can occur with a range
of inflation targets, including positive inflation. This feature allows for Friedman
satiation without the difficulties associated with negative inflation rates [see McAn-
drews, 2015]. For example, Friedman satiation occurs when the target inflation rate
is 2 percent, the tax rate is 53.5 percent, and the ratio of money stock to output is
1.75.
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Figure 3.5: Marginal product of money for various money stock regimes
3.4.3 Exploration 3 - Inflation Rate Targeting
The inflation rate has been of particular interest of late. The U.S. Federal Reserve
Board has been vocal about wanting to increase the inflation rate to the normal rate
of 2 percent. Many have been puzzled by the persistently low inflation rate, which is
currently near zero and is expected to stay under 2 percent for the next 30 years. 1
However, is low inflation a bad thing? Since price stability is part of a Federal Reserve
congressional mandate, a theory that can address inflation rate targeting regimes is
needed.
In this section, the interest rate on money is held fixed so that we can focus on the
consequences of inflation rate targeting regimes. Various inflation rate policies are
chosen. We consider only policies for which there is not satiation. This restricts the
inflation rate target to be greater than or equal to 1.9 percent. The tax rate varies
endogenously in order to have government expenditures equal to government receipts.
Since interest on money is held fixed, the money stock also varies endogenously across
1Subtract the expected return on inflation-indexed Treasury securities from the expected return
on nominal Treasury securities to see this.
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Figure 3.6: Labor tax rates for inflation rate targeting regimes
policies.
Figure 3.6 shows that a higher labor tax rate is associated with a lower inflation
rate regime. Inflation is a form of tax on money. A higher inflation rate regime has
a lower labor income tax rate, higher labor supply, and higher consumption. This
raises the interesting possibility of using a money tax to reduce the labor distortion
created by financing the government through labor income tax.
Figure 3.7 shows steady-state welfare as measured by consumption equivalents
(CEs) for various inflation rate targeting regimes. Since higher inflation is associated
with lower labor income tax, in a higher inflation rate regime, more labor is sup-
plied and the consumption level is higher.The higher inflation increases hours worked
(decreasing welfare) but also increases consumption (increasing welfare). This explo-
ration shows that different inflation rates have, in fact, very little impact on steady-
state welfare.
3.5 Possible Problems and Advantages
Some problems with this system are apparent. Privacy protection would need to
be considered. We will not deal with this more general problem here. Also, in an
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Figure 3.7: Steady-state welfare indicator for various inflation rate targets
environment in which banks are purely transactional institutions, shadow banking
could be an issue.
We offer a possible solution to the shadow banking issue. To effectively eliminate
businesses that borrow low from one group and lend high to another, the government
could tax net interest income at a 100 percent rate for limited liability businesses.
This approach would remove any incentive to engage in shadow banking.
Our proposed reforms also have possible advantages. First, bank runs would be
prevented because banks would have nowhere to run. 2 Whenever a transaction
takes place between private agents, one party’s demand deposit account is credited
by the amount of the transaction, and the other partys demand deposit is debited by
the same amount. Second, our reforms would eliminate the need for costly regula-
tions, as is associated with the U.S. deposit insurance system. A 100 percent reserve
requirement would eliminate the need for stress tests and regulatory entities to en-
sure that banks are not taking on excessive risk. These activities cost about one-half
percent per year per dollar deposited at commercial banks. This amount represents
2A number of economists have proposed a 100 percent reserve for demand deposits as an arrange-
ment that is not prone to bank runs. They include Fisher [1936] and Friedman [1960], and more
recently Cochrane [2014], Prescott [2014], and Smith [2013].
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a non-negligible cost.
One claimed cost of the monetary system we explore is that it would increase the
cost of financing because of the higher commercial bank equity cost. This argument is
that with 100 percent reserve banking, bank equity would be higher and bank equity
is costly. Admati and Hellwig [2013] establish that bank equity is not costly. With
our monetary system, demand deposits are what our households and the businesses
choose to hold. Another claim often made is that fractional reserve banking is valuable
in providing maturity transformation, because agents want to lend short and borrow
long. The agents in our world can hold as much money as they want; that is, they
can lend short as much as they want. There is no need for maturity transformation.
We emphasize that much needs to be done before the theory can be used to make
predictions as to the consequences of alternative policy. As done in McGrattan and
Prescott [2016] for the consequences of an alternative tax policy regime, demographic
projections must be made and introduced into the model economy being used. In ad-
dition, the equilibrium transition path to the balanced growth path for the alternative
policy regime must be determined.
3.6 Concluding Comments
We explore an alternative financial system that is possible given the current state
of information processing technology. Before this system could be implemented, ex-
isting law would have to be changed to permit business enterprises to hold interest-
bearing money.
This exploration is necessary because, in our assessment, existing theory does not
provide predictions about the consequences of alternative monetary policy regimes.
The trial-and-error approach that characterizes current monetary policy is fraught
with danger; therefore, better theory is needed. We hope that this paper fosters
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fruitful theoretical work on reforming the payment system.
By integrating money into valuation theory, the tools of aggregate public finance
can be and are applied. This is not the first use of these tools to quantitatively predict
the consequences of alternative monetary policy regimes. These studies modeled the
households holding of M1, which was held for transaction purposes. It was motivated
by Meltzers [1963] finding of a reasonably stable M1 velocity depending on the short-
term interest rate. Lucas and Stokey [1987] develop a transaction-based theory of
this transaction demand for money. Cooley and Hansen [1989] introduced the Lucas-
Stokey theory with cash and credit goods into the neoclassical growth model and
carried out a quantitative general equilibrium analysis of the cost of modest inflation.
This transaction-based theory does not account for the large holding of cash re-
serves by businesses. Hodrick [2013] reports that in 2013, the cash reserves of Amer-
ican businesses were nearly equal to annual GNP. This does not include the cash
reserves of businesses in the household sector. Households accumulate cash reserves
in order to be able to make a down payment on a residence or a car. One implication
is that much of M3 is made up of the cash reserves held by household businesses. Cash
reserves are held by businesses because they are productive assets that facilitate the
operation of the business sector.
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3.8 Appendix
The production function used in this analysis is continuous but not differentiable
everywhere. This appendix describes one way to smooth out the kink in the produc-
tion function. This is a mathematical exercise with little influence on the economic
reasoning of this paper, but is nonetheless important. For simplicity of exposition,
the work presented in the main body of the paper did not include this mathematical
detail except where noted.
To smooth the kink in the production function, we divide an isoquant of the pro-
duction function into three segments, as shown in Figure 3.8. Because the production
function exhibits constant returns to scale, one isoquant has the same properties as
every isoquant as production is scaled up or down.
Let λ1 and λ2 be parameters of the production function and let λ1 > λ2 . These
parameters define segments of the aggregate production function isoquant with differ-
ent elasticities of substitution between the composite capital-labor good and money.
When m < λ2z, the production function is Cobb-Douglas and exhibits constant
elasticity of substitution between the composite capital-labor good and money. The
portion of each production function isoquant that has this property is identified as
Region A in Figure 3.8. When m > λ1z , the production function exhibits zero
elasticity of substitution between the composite capital-labor good and money. The
portion of each production function isoquant that has this property is identified as
Region C in Figure 3.8.
To smooth the non-differentiable portion of the aggregate production function,
we introduce a segment of the production function defined when λ2z ≤ m ≤ λ1z.
On this segment of the production function isoquant, the elasticity of substitution
between the composite capital-labor good and money falls from the constant value is
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Figure 3.8: Modified production function isoquant
Region A to zero in Region C. This transition region is labeled Region B in Figure
3.8.
In Region B in Figure 3.8, the marginal product of money transitions smoothly
between a positive value in Region A and zero in Region C. Including the transition
region, the marginal product of money is
δy
δm
=

(1− φ) y
m
if mt < λ2zt (constant elacticity region)
(1− φ) y
m
[
m
z
−λ1
λ1−λ2 ] if λ2z ≤ mt ≤ λ1zt (transition region)
0 if mt > λ1zt (zero elacticity region)
(3.12)
When m = λ2z , the bracketed term in the second line is one and the marginal
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product of money is equal to that in the constant elasticity region. Similarly, when
m = λ1z , the bracketed term in the second line is zero and marginal product of
money is equal to the marginal product of money in the zero elasticity region. This
smooths the kink in the production function.
We can recover the production function that gives this marginal product by solving
(2.12) as a first-order differential equation and choosing integration constants in each
region to ensure the production function is continuous. This yields a continuous,
smooth production function as follows:
y =

Azφm1−φ if mt < λ2zt (constant elacticity region)
Azφm1−φT (m, z, λ1, λ2, φ) if λ2z ≤ mt ≤ λ1zt (transition region)
Azλ1−φ1 G(λ1, λ2, φ) if mt > λ1zt (zero elacticity region)
(3.13)
This is similar to the production function presented in the main body of the paper,
except for the transition region and functions T and G. The functions T and G are
quite messy, but can be solved numerically. The functions are
T (m, z, λ1, λ2, φ) = (
λ2z
m
)
λ2(1−φ)
λ2−λ1 e
(
1−φ)
λ2−λ1 (
m
z
−λ2) (3.14)
G(λ1, λ2, φ) = (
λ2
m
)
λ2(1−φ)
λ2−λ1 e(φ−1) (3.15)
Without the transition region, there is a discontinuous jump in Figures 3.4 and
3.5 of the main body of this paper. This occurs at the non-differentiable point of the
production function. Allowing for a transition region as described above smooths this
discontinuity.
For example, in Figure 3.5 of the main body of the paper (repeated as left panel of
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Figure 3.9: Marginal product of money without (left) and with (right) transition
region
Figure 3.9 in this appendix), the marginal product of money discontinuously jumps
to zero as the steady state growth money stock exceeds the satiation level. When we
add in the transition region, the jump is smoothed (see right panel of Figure 3.9).
The closer in value are the parameters λ1 and λ2 , the steeper the transition. For
figures presented in the appendix, we chose λ1 = 2 and λ2 = 1.95 .
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Chapter 4
UNCONVENTIONAL MONETARY POLICY IN A MODERN PARADIGM OF
MONEY
4.1 Introduction
There is currently discussion on the merits of moving to a currency-less fiat mon-
etary system as technological advances have made such a system possible. India and
the European Central Bank have already enacted policies that discourage the use
of currency in transactions. India eliminated the 500 and 1,000 rupee note in 2016.
That same year, the European Central Bank began phasing out the 500 euro note.
Ostensibly, these policies were enacted to reduce tax evasion and give the government
greater control over the financial system.
Establishing new economic theory based on these changes is an ongoing endeavor.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate unconventional monetary policy tools within
a model that takes into account how advances in information processing technology
are changing the way modern economies use money. Because electronic transfers make
the velocity of circulation virtually infinite, theory based on the quantity equation
may need to be revised. Stiglitz and Greenwald (2003) argue that there is no longer
an opportunity cost of holding money at the margin, rendering obsolete monetary
economics based on a money demand equation. New theory is needed.
Recently, Prescott and Wessel (2015) introduced a model that explored currency-
less fiat money, called fiat value, in a general equilibrium theory-of-value framework.
In this paper, I extend the fiat value model of Prescott and Wessel in a way that
allows me to evaluate the consequences of unconventional monetary policy, namely
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quantitative easing and interest on reserves policies. The main assumptions of this
model are that currency-less fiat money is a form of interest bearing government debt,
the services of the stock of fiat value are a factor of production, and that there is a
satiation level of money stock above which the marginal product of money is zero.
The two unconventional monetary policy tools that I evaluate are quantitative
easing (QE) and interest on reserves (IOR). Following the 2008 financial crises, the
United States Federal Reserve engaged in QE by purchasing government debt and
real assets with central bank notes. This swelled the size of the central bank’s assets
from 5% of GDP in 2008 to 25% of GDP in 2015. This was the largest the Fed’s
balance sheet had ever been, including during the great depression (23% of GDP)
and the end of WWII (20% of GDP). Additionally, on October 1, 2008, the Fed
began paying interest on reserves held by depository institutions at reserve banks,
a policy authorized by the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 and the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008. Since 2008, the IOR rate has varied
between 25 and 140 basis points and, as of 2016, was 50 basis points for both required
and excess reserves.
These policies were designed to increase liquidity and lower long-term yields
(Bernanke 2015). Under traditional assumptions about the purpose of money, many
models conclude that QE and IOR are either neutral or are effective policy tools in
times of financial crisis (Wallace 1981, Bernanke and Reinhart 2004, Vayanos and
Vila 2009, Gertler and Karadi 2013, Reis 2016).
I argue that with currency-less fiat money, the services of which are a factor of
production, QE is a welfare increasing response to a liquidity crisis, but a positive
IOR rate has a negative effect on a measure of aggregate welfare during a liquidity
crisis. In this environment, QE works by driving the marginal product of money to
zero, eliminating any gap between the marginal product of money and the marginal
65
cost of producing money (assumed zero). When the economy is ”satiated” in money,
the business sector does not have to pay for the services of a production factor that
is free to create. This increases total output and welfare. Additional QE in excess
of the economy’s satiation level has no effect, nominal or real, on output or prices.
This suggests there may be benefit to maintaining a perpetually large Federal Reserve
balance sheet.
Positive interest on reserves policies, however, mute the effect of quantitative
easing. A positive IOR rate induces agents to deposit money at the central bank,
restricting the availability of money to the business sector. This creates a positive
lower bound on the marginal product of money which is equal to the IOR rate.
Monetary satiation cannot be achieved when the IOR rate is positive.
Under current U.S. policy, the IOR rate is strictly positive and there is almost
$4 Trillion in bank reserves on deposit at the central bank. I also ask, ”Would a
money outflow caused by reducing the IOR rate to zero cause excess inflation?” In
this model, the answer is no. The price level would not significantly raise because
money in a satiated economy is identical to bonds. Above the satiation level of money
stock, withdrawing money from the central bank is analogous to swapping one type
of government debt instrument for another identical type. This ”shuffling” of the
central bank balance sheet has no real or nominal effects in the model.
The paper is arranged as follows. Section II describes the model. Section III
introduces a way to model a liquidity crisis, and explores the effects of quantitative
easing and interest on reserves policies in response to a liquidity crisis. Section V
concludes.
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4.2 The Model Economy
The agents in this model are an infinitely-lived household, a government, and an
aggregate production firm. There is constant growth and no uncertainty in living
standards. While this model is based on the model of Prescott and Wessel (2015),
the way I model the liquidity shock and policy response is unique to this paper.
4.2.1 Preferences
There is a measure 1 of identical households with preferences ordered by
∞∑
t=0
βt[log(ct) + α log(1− ht)] (4.1)
where ct > 0 is consumption and ht ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of the time endowment
allocated to the market. The parameter β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor. The
parameter α determines the relative shares of consumption and leisure. This form
of the utility function was assumed for convenience. Repeating the exercise with a
different functional form (a different Frisch elasticity of labor supply for example)
does not qualitatively effect the results.
4.2.2 Technology
Inputs to the business sector are the services of non-human capital kt, the services
of human capital ht, and the services of the money stock mt. For convenience, I will
use the simple term ”money” when referring to currency-less fiat money. There is
labor augmenting technical growth. The aggregate production function is
yt =

Aλ1−φzt if mt ≥ λzt
Azφtm
1−φ
t if mt < λzt
(4.2)
where
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Figure 4.1: A Production Function Isoquant
zt = k
θ
t [(1 + γ)ht]
1−θ (4.3)
Figure 4.1 shows an output isoquant of the aggregate production function. The
aggregate production function is increasing, weakly concave, and displays constant
returns to scale. The marginal product of money m is zero if m ≥ λz.
λ is a parameter that determines the point at which the economy is satiated with
money. This is a key parameter of the model.
4.2.3 Budget Constraints
Households hold three stocks of assets: capital kt, money mt, and government debt
bt. These are the individual state variables. Households also supply labor services ht.
The inflation rate, possibly negative, is pit =
pt+1
pt
−1; government lump-sum transfers
in cash or in kind are ψ; rk and rm are the rental price of capital k and money m;
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and ib and im are the interest rates paid on the two forms of government debt, money
m and bond b. I use capital letters to denote nominal quantities.
Household
In units of dollars, the date t household budget constraint is
Ct+Xt+Mt+1+Bt+1 = (1−τt)Wtht+(1+rk)Kt+(1+ib)Bt+(1+im+rm)Mt+Ψt (4.4)
where
Xt = Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt (4.5)
Insert equation (3.5) into (3.4) and divide by the date t price level. In units of
the consumption/investment good, the date t household real budget constraint is
ct + kt+1 + (1 + pit)mt+1 + (1 + pit)bt+1 = (4.6)
(1− τ)wtht + (1− δ + rk)kt + (1 + ib)bt + (1 + im + rm)mt + ψt
This states that expenditures are for consumption, investment in capital, currency
acquisition, and government debt acquisition. Receipts are equal to the after-tax
labor income, rental income on (non-human) capital less depreciation, rental income
on money, interest payments on the two forms of government debt, and lump-sum
transfers received from the government.
Firm
Given constant returns to scale, revenue is equal to costs, or
y = wh+ rkk + rmm (4.7)
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Government
The government’s pure public consumption in units of dollars is G. The interest rates
on the two types of government debt are im and ib. The government’s nominal budget
constraint is
Gt + Ψt + imtMt + ibtBt = τWtht + (Mt+1 −Mt) + (Bt+1 −Bt) (4.8)
Equivalently, the government budget constraint can be written in real terms as
gt + ψ + immt + ibbt = τwtht + [mt+1(1 + pi)−mt] + [bt+1(1 + pi)− bt] (4.9)
The government can finance expenditures through the labor tax (τ), increasing
the money supply (mt+1−mt), running a deficit (bt+1−bt), or taxing through inflation
(pi).
4.2.4 Equilibrium
Prices are {wt, rkt, rmt, ibt, imt, pit}∞t=0. Equilibrium conditions are
1. Households choose an optimal sequence of {ct, ht, kt+1,mt+1, bt+1}∞t=0 given prices
and their budget constraints.
2. Firms choose the value maximizing {ht, kt,mt} given period t rental prices.
3. The government selection of {gt, ψt, τt,mt+1, bt+1}∞t=0 are such that its budget
constraints for all t, given prices, are satisfied.
4.2.5 Balanced Growth
To define a baseline economy, I start with balanced growth. The state of the
household is its holdings at the beginning of the period of money stock (mt), govern-
ment debt stock (bt), and capital stock (kt). Along the balanced growth path, these
stocks grow at a constant rate γ.
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Table 4.1: Government policy regime for the baseline steady-state economy.
Government Policy
g/y government public goods share 0.05
ψ/y transfer share 0.20
τ labor tax rate 0.52
b government debt to output 0.5
m money debt to output 1.5
pi inflation rate 2.0 %
4.2.6 Baseline Economy
The baseline economy is on a balanced growth path that roughly matches the U.S.
economy in consumption and investment shares, fraction of time worked, asset stocks
to output ratios, and factor income shares. The growth rate is assumed 2.2%, which
is roughly equal to U.S. growth in the 10 years leading up to the financial crisis of
2008.
Table 4.1 is the government policy regime chosen for the baseline economy. The
high value of the money stock (1.5 GNP) is chosen to take into account what Williamson
(2012) calls private and public liquidity. Businesses make large payments using
shadow banking and small payments using the banking sector.
Table 4.2 presents the calibration results. The only parameter of note is the money
cost share (1−θ). This parameter is not in standard models, and was first introduced
by Prescott and Wessel (2015). This parameter controls how important money is in
production. Further work is needed to determine the appropriate range of values for
this parameter. I assume that the money cost share is 1%, the value used in Prescott
and Wessel (2015). As a robustness check, I repeated all experiments in the range
1− θ = [0.001, 0.05] and the results were qualitatively identical.
71
Table 4.2: Preference and Technology parameter values and targets for the baseline
steady-state economy. All values are jointly determined. Because total output is
normalized to 1, levels and shares are identical.
Parameters Targets
α preference for leisure 0.64 h fraction worked 0.4
β discount rate 0.96 xk investment 0.22
δ depreciation rate 0.05 k/y capital stock 3.04
θ capital cost share 0.35 wh/y labor share 0.65
1− φ money cost share 0.01 pi inflation rate 2.0%
A TFP 1.2 y output 1.0
4.3 Satiation, Quantitative Easing, and Interest on Reserves
In this section, I use the baseline economy to evaluate quantitative easing (QE)
and interest on reserves (IOR) policies in response to a satiation parameter shock.
The satiation parameter shock is designed to approximate the effect of an unexpected
liquidity crisis. Stokey and Lucas (2011) argue that the recession of 2008 was exacer-
bated by a liquidity crisis where economic agents hoarded cash and the repo market
experienced something similar to a bank run.
4.3.1 Satiation Parameter Shock
I model a liquidity crisis as an increase in the parameter λ, the satiation level of
money stock. Satiation means that the marginal product of money is zero and occurs
when the ratio of money to a composite of capital and labor z is sufficiently high, or
m ≥ z/λ.
I understand monetary satiation, consider a stylized business sector with one
factory that produces output using only capital. Capital can only be rented using a
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type of government debt called money which the government issued in units it called
dollars ($). Suppose the factory needed $10 of this government debt to resolve the
time inconsistency between when the owners of capital required payment and when
the output could be sold. If the government fixed the price level and only provided $8
in money to the economy, the factory would face a money constraint keeping it from
producing maximum output. The marginal product of an additional dollar would be
strictly positive. Now suppose the government fixed the price level and provided $12
in money. In this case, the marginal product of an additional dollar would be zero.
In this example, the satiation level is $10.
What might cause an increase in the satiation level of the economy? Anything
that raises the level of money stock needed to transact business: money hoarding,
increased counter-party risk, decreased willingness to provide business-to-business
credit, decreased bank lending, etc.
There is evidence that the level of money stock needed to transact business in-
creased during the 2008 recession. Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010) show that bank
lending decreased substantially during the financial crisis. They find that new loans
to large borrowers during the peak of the financial crisis (2008Q4) fell by 79% relative
to the peak of the credit boom (2007Q2). Becker and Ivashina (2011) argue that there
was a sharp decrease in bank loan supply associated with the financial crisis. Further,
from 2008 to 2012, U.S. Nonfinancial Corporate Businesses increased aggregate liquid
assets from $1.5 Trillion to $1.8 Trillion, a 20% increase (Flow of Funds F.103).
For the experiments in this section, I wish to highlight the difference between
economies that are satiated in money and those that are not satiated. To do this, I
assume a government policy that produces a baseline economy that is just satiated
in money. I then unexpectedly and permanently raise λ, the satiation parameter. I
chose values of the satiation parameter (1.8 and 2.0) such that the economy switches
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from just satiated to just non-satiated. Because an increase in the satiation level is
plausibly associated with the 2008 financial crisis, a model economy that can predict
the results of a switch from satiation to non-satiation might be informative.
Figure 4.2 shows what happens to the balanced growth path when the satiation
parameter is unexpectedly and permanently increased. In the figure, the shock hap-
pens unexpectedly at the end of period 3 and there is no policy response to the
shock. The economy converges (convergence approximated by dashed line) to a new
balanced growth path characterized by a lower level of output. Output is lower be-
cause non-satiation means there is a gap between the marginal cost of producing
money (assumed zero) and the now positive marginal product of money.
For comparison, Figure 4.3 shows historical values of U.S. log GDP for 2005 to
2015. From 2009 to 2015, GDP was about 7% below historical trend. The model
predicts that a shock to the satiation parameter at the levels chosen can account for
about 15% of the reduction in output, assuming the money cost share is 1%. Inciden-
tally, if I assume the money cost share is 20% (which most certainly is unrealistic!),
the model generates a GDP drop approximately equal to that seen from 2009-2015.
In summary, when government monetary policy does not respond to an increase
in liquidity needs in the economy, GDP can drop below trend. This is because firms
must pay for the services of a factor of production (money) which is free to create.
This is an inefficiency.
4.3.2 Quantitative Easing
Beginning in 2008, the Federal Reserve engaged in three rounds of QE, greatly
increasing the size of its balance sheet. Figure 4.4 shows that the increase in assets
came primarily from purchasing Mortgage Backed Securities and U.S. Treasury Se-
curities with bank deposits. Base money, defined as the sum of (1) coin and currency
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Figure 4.2: Model simulation of a shock to the satiation parameter in the economy.
For periods one through three, λ = 1.8. For periods four through 11, λ = 2.
Figure 4.3: U.S. log GDP over time. Data from research.stlouisfed.org and author’s
calculations. Trendline refers to assume trend growth of 2.2%.
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Figure 4.4: Federal Reserve Balance Sheet. Data from H.4.1 statistical release
(weekly) and author’s calculations.
held outside the Fed and Treasury and (2) deposits held by banks at the Federal
Reserve, increased by almost 400%.
In this section, I will show how QE can be an effective response to a liquidity
crisis, modeled here as a satiation parameter shock. For modeling purposes, QE
is defined as a change from the current government policy regime to a new policy
regime with higher money stock and lower bond stock. This way of modeling QE has
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the advantage of specifying the mechanism by which QE money is injected into the
economy, namely it is traded for bonds.
To model a swap of money for government debt, let dt be the total stock of
government debt (money plus bonds) in units of fiat value, and let ηt ∈ [0, 1] be the
fraction of total government debt held as money. Thus
dt = mt + bt (4.10)
mt = ηtdt (4.11)
bt = (1− ηt)dt (4.12)
With this definition of variables, a government policy regime is defined as
regimet = {gt, ψt, τt, dt+1, ηt+1} (4.13)
In Figure 4.5, I compare the steady state equilibrium of government policy regimes
that differ only in η, the fraction of government debt held as money. Government
spending (g), government transfers (ψ), labor tax rate (τ), and total government debt
(d) are held fixed. Output, inflation, and interest rates are determined in equilibrium.
My measure of welfare is consumption equivalent variation (CEV), meaning the per-
cent by which an individual’s consumption must be changed in order to make him
indifferent among policy regimes. This measure of welfare is for only one type and
does not take into account transitions, but it is suggestive.
In the top panel of Figure 4.5, welfare increases with the fraction of debt held as
money (η) in the economy. Welfare jumps when η is sufficiently high such that the
economy is satiated in money, meaning that the marginal product of money is zero.
Call this point η∗. 1 For the baseline economy with λ = 1.8, the satiation point is
η∗ = 0.73. Additional QE above the satiation point has no effect on welfare.
1The jump occurs because of the kink in the production function. The mathematical appendix
of Prescott and Wessel 2015 shows one way to smooth out the kink.
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Figure 4.5: Model predictions of welfare for various regimes of total government
debt held as money. Quantitative easing is an increase in money to total debt ratio.
Comparing the top and bottom panel, we see that a higher money to total debt policy
(η) is needed to satiate the economy when the satiation parameter (λ) is higher. This
implies that QE can be a welfare increasing response to upward satiation parameter
shocks.
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Additional QE above the satiation point η∗ does not increase output because the
economy is already satiated in money. On the production function isoquant in Figure
4.1, this represents points on the isoquant to the right of the diagonal line, where
the marginal product of money is zero. Because the marginal product of money is
zero, there is no balancing increase in capital stock or labor supply associated with
the increase in the money stock.
Similarly, adding more money to an economy that is satiated has no negative
effects. Since the marginal product of money is zero, money and government debt
are identical government debt instruments. Additional QE above the satiation point
is simply a balance sheet shuffle where one type of government debt instrument is
traded for another identical government debt instrument. Neither the labor tax rate
nor the inflation rate need to adjust to balance the government budget.
This theoretical finding is consistent with empirical observations that the first
round of QE had a much larger influence on the U.S. economy than QEII and QEIII
(Nellis 2013, Gagnon, et.al 2010, Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2011). Per-
haps this is because the first round of QE pushed the economy over the point where
additional QE would be effective.
The bottom panel of Figure 4.5 shows that when the satiation parameter (λ) is
higher, a higher η is needed to maximize this measure of welfare. When λ = 2, the
satiation point occurs at η∗ = 0.82.
Given a satiation parameter λ, any government policy regimes with η > η∗ is
welfare maximizing. If one anticipates future upward shocks to the satiation param-
eter, the policy that most effectively insulates against satiation parameter shocks is
one where η = 1, assuming that η ∈ [0, 1]. This implies that government policy can
insulate against future liquidity crises by maintaining a permanently large Federal
Reserve large balance sheet.
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The interesting possibility of increasing the fraction of debt held as money such
that η > 1 is not explored here. This would require assuming that government debt
could be negative, which would be a fiscal policy exploration and is not the subject
of this monetary policy study.
4.3.3 Interest on Reserves
In the previous section, it was shown that QE can be a welfare increasing policy
response to an upward shock to the satiation parameter λ. In this section, I will show
that positive interest on reserves (IOR) policies can work against QE in increasing
the available stock of money in the economy, undoing the positive effects of QE.
Paying interest on excess reserves was legalized when Congress passed the Finan-
cial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006 and the Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008. These acts authorized the Federal Reserve to pay interest on balances
held by depository institutions at reserve banks beginning October 1, 2008. The
Federal Reserve chose to immediately exercise that option. The IOR rate has varied
between 25 and 140 basis points and was 50 basis points at the end of 2016. 2 The
2016 IOR policy regime allows an unlimited amount of money to be deposited at the
Federal Reserve with a risk-free 50 basis point return.
A no arbitrage condition of the model economy is that the rate of return on bonds
(ib) is equal to the total rate of return on money, where money is paid both from the
government (im) and from the business sector (rm).
ib = im + rm (4.14)
In a satiated economy, the rental price of money services in the business sector
2For approximately 1 month in October 2008, the Federal Reserve paid a different rate of interest
on required reserves than on excess reserves. For the sake of this analysis, I treat excess reserves
and required reserves as identical.
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Figure 4.6: Model predictions of marginal product of money for various money stock
regimes in units of fraction of total government debt. The marginal product of money
is zero for monetary policies that produce monetary satiation.
(rm) is zero; money and bonds are identical debt instruments. The value of the rental
price of money services is controlled by government policy. A higher money stock
policy is associated with a lower rental price of money services. Figure 4.6 shows
the marginal product of money (in basis points) associated with various money stock
policies in the baseline model economy.
Consider a satiated balanced growth economy where the government unexpectedly
announced a positive Interest on Reserves policy. A rational agent would redeployed
money from the business sector, where the rental price of money is zero, to the Fed
because the Fed offers a higher return. This reduces the stock of money available to
the business sector. As money is deposited at the Fed, the government works down a
money supply schedule where both the stock of money and the interest paid by the
government (im) are lower.
In equilibrium, money deployed to the business sector and money deposited at
the Fed earn the same total rate. In equilibrium,
rm = iIOR (4.15)
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Figure 4.7: Model predictions of marginal product of money for various regimes of
total government debt held as money. A positive interest on reserves rate is a lower
bound on the marginal product of money.
A strictly positive IOR policy regime bounds the marginal product of money
away from zero (Figure 4.7). In effect, a positive IOR policy makes it impossible for
government money stock policy, such as QE, to drive the marginal product of money
to zero.
These results can be summarized in two propositions:
Proposition 1 (Zero IOR Equivalence): For every government monetary policy
[η, iIOR] where iIOR > 0, there exists a government policy [η
′, i′IOR] where i
′
IOR = 0
and η′ ≤ η with the same marginal product of money.
Proposition 2 (Non-Satiation): An economy with monetary policy where iIOR >
0 cannot be satiated.
These results suggest that a rational monetary authority operating in this model
world would not choose to implement a positive interest on reserves policy as a re-
sponse to a monetary satiation shock.
82
4.3.4 Inflation
Currently there is public discussion surrounding the inflation rate. Base money
(cash plus deposits held by banks at the Fed) has increased by 400% since 2008, but
the inflation rate was less than 2% for at least 8 years following the 2008 recession,
and as of 2016 was expected to stay under 2% for the next 30 years. 3 Why did the
price level not increased more drastically?
One explanation for the lack of inflation is that money velocity has drastically
decreased. Even though QE increased the stock of money, most of that money is on
deposit at the Federal Reserve and is not involved in transactions.
In this section, I explore what this model predicts for the inflation rate when the
money stock drastically increases. Specifically, I ask what would happen if member
banks decided to withdraw their deposits from the Federal Reserve. Such a withdrawal
would mean that member banks trade an IOU from the Fed for cash. In the model
framework, this is equivalent to increasing η, the fraction of government debt held as
money.
Would withdrawing large amounts of money from the Federal Reserve drastically
increase the price level? The answer is no. Increases in the money stock can effect
the price level only when the economy is not satiated. Additional increases beyond
the satiation level have no effect on the price level.
This model relies on a fiscal theory of the price level to determine the inflation
rate, meaning that the government’s choice of tax and debt policy plays a crucial role
in determining inflation. 4 In steady state, the government budget balances, or
g + ψ + imm+ ibb = τwh+ pi(m+ b) (4.16)
3To see this, subtract the expected return on inflation-indexed Treasury securities from the
expected return on nominal Treasury securities
4See Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999) for a critique of the fiscal theory of the price level.
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Recall that the no arbitrage equilibrium condition implies that the interest rate
of money is equal the the return on bonds minus the marginal product of money, or
im = ib − rm. Substitute this into (4.16):
g + ψ + ib(m+ b)− rmm = τwh+ pi(m+ b) (4.17)
Equation (4.17) shows that only when the marginal product of money (rm) is non-
zero does a change in the composition of total government debt (m+ b) have an effect
on the government budget equation. When the marginal product of money is zero
(i.e. the economy is satiated), money and debt are identical. Therefore, increasing
the money stock (by withdrawing cash from the Fed, by government policy, etc.)
can only influence the price level up to the satiation point. Beyond satiation, the
composition of total government debt has no effect on the price level.
4.4 Conclusion
From recent developments, such as the European Central Bank phasing out the
500 euro note and India eliminating the 500 and 1000 rupee note, it seems that some
economies are moving toward a currency-less fiat monetary system. It is my view
that current theory lags these advances and may not provide accurate predictions as
to the consequences of various government policies operating in such a system.
I have shown that in a currency-less fiat monetary system with money as a factor
of production, government policy can have different consequences than in a model
with more traditional assumptions about the use and definition of money. In a mod-
ern paradigm of money, upward satiation shocks can decrease output and welfare,
quantitative easing is a welfare-increasing response to a liquidity shock, a positive
interest on reserves policy decreases output, and the size of the money stock has no
effect on the price level in a satiated economy.
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The social desirability of moving to a currency-less fiat monetary system is a large,
open question. Further research in this area may prove fruitful.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
The three papers presented in this dissertation are the culmination of my research
work while in doctoral studies at Arizona State University. In the first, “Vehicle
Emissions Inspection Programs: Equality and Impact,” I presented the results of a
quantitative study of the Arizona Vehicle Emissions Inspection Program. I found that
the Arizona Vehicle Emissions Inspection Program is regressive in that it constrains
the vehicle repair decisions of people in the low end of the income distribution more
than people in the high end. Individuals with a lower annual income are both (i)
more likely to drive vehicles that fail inspection at a higher average rate, and (ii)
more likely to fail inspection conditional on vehicle characteristics. I also found that
the social cost of administering the Vehicle Emissions Inspection Program in Arizona
is more than twice the social benefit using a $7 million value of statistical life.
In the second, “Fiat Value in the Theory of Value,” I presented the results of
theoretical work. This paper was written jointly with Edward C. Prescott. Currency-
less fiat money is now technically feasible and some governments are enacting policies
that encourage a currency-less system. We explored one such system. We developed
a general equilibrium theory-of-value model based on advances in the way modern
industrial economies execute transactions. In our model, fiat value is a form of interest
bearing government debt, the services of which are a factor of production. While
much work remains to be done, this paper represents a first step in understanding
the consequences of various monetary policy regimes in a currency-less fiat value
system.
In the third paper, “Unconventional Monetary Policy in a Modern Paradigm of
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Money,” I explore quantitative easing and interest on reserves policies in a currency-
less fiat monetary system. I argued that quantitative easing is an effective response
to liquidity crises because it drives the marginal product of money to zero. When the
marginal product of money is zero, the business sector does not have to pay to rent
the services of money, a production factor that is free to create. I also argued that,
contrary to previously published results, positive interest on reserves policies exac-
erbate a liquidity crisis by hampering the effects of quantitative easing. I suggested
that a central banking authority operating in this model world would insulate against
future liquidity crises by maintaining a permanently large balance sheet and setting
the rate for interest on reserves to zero.
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APPENDIX A
PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED WORK
The paper “Fiat Value in the Theory of Value” was previously published with
Edward C. Prescott as ”Monetary Policy with 100 Percent Reserve Banking: An Ex-
ploration” in Minneapolis Fed Research Staff Report 530 June 2016, and in National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 22431 July 2016.
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